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Abstract
Since the first wave of nuclear reactors in 1970 to the
construction of Generation III+ reactors in Finland and France
in 2005 and 2007 respectively, nuclear power seems to be doomed
to a cost escalation curse. In this paper we reexamine this issue
for the French nuclear power fleet. Using the construction costs
from the Cour des Comptes report, that was publicly available
in 2012, we found that previous studies overestimated the cost
escalation. Although, it is undeniable that the scale-up ended
up in more costly reactors, we found evidence of a learning curve
within the same size and type of reactors. This result confirms that
standardization is a good direction to look, in order to overcome
the cost escalation curse.
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1 Introduction
The cost escalation that has characterized the construction of new
nuclear power plants seems to put into question the economic viability
of this technology as part of the energy mix in different countries.
In the case of the U.S, where 104 nuclear reactors have been installed,
the overnight cost in USD2010/MW for the first unit was 7 times less
than the one for the last reactor. This phenomenon has been widely
studied in economic literature1, and the general understanding is that
the decentralized and heterogeneous way in which the nuclear fleet grew
and the stricter safety rules that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission set
after Three Mile Island accident2 are the main drivers of the U.S cost
escalation.
In turn, France has the second largest nuclear fleet worldwide (58
reactors) and its nuclear program has been catalogued as a success.
According to David and Rothwell (1996), the centralized and monolithic
industrial structure has been the key element in avoiding the U.S cost
escalation path. Likewise, Grubler (2010) argued that due to this
centralized institutional setting, the nuclear fleet in France grew rapidly,
substantially and systemically.
However, when the French construction cost were analyzed by Grubler
(2010), he found an important cost escalation. The comparison between
the construction costs in FF98/kW for the units installed in 1974 and
the post 1990 constructed reactors, yielded in an increase by a factor of
about 3.5. This finding suggested that even under the best conditions
as prevailing in France (i.e. centralized decision making, high degree of
standardization and regulatory stability), cost escalation is inherent to
nuclear power.
Nowadays, history is repeating itself. The cost escalation is confirmed
with the construction of the first Generation III+ reactors. In Finland,
the original fixed-price contract for the Olkiluto EPR3 was for e3 billion
in 2003, which meant a cost prevision of e2010 2.100/kW. In 2010, the
costs were revised and it was acknowledged that they had reached e2010
5.7 billion (i.e. e2010 3.500/kW4).
1 See Komanoff (1981), Zimmerman (1982), Cantor and Hewlett (1988), McCabe
(1996) and Cooper (2012),
2 See Cantor and Hewlett (1988) and Cooper (2012)
3 European Pressurized Reactor
4 http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/newreactors/eprcrisis31110.pdf
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Similarly, the initial cost of the Flamanville EPR reactor in France
increased from to e2010 3.3 billions to e2011 6 billions, with an expected
delay of 9 years5. These construction costs represent e2010 3.650/kW,
that is to say, almost three times the e2010 1.250/kW of the last N4
nuclear reactor built in France (Civaux).
For the Westinghouse AP1000 the story is the same. According to
Parsons and Du (2009), the overnight costs registered in the applications
submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission lie between USD2010
3.650/kW and USD2010 5.100/kW. This represent at least a 75% increase
with respect to the USD20102.400/kW estimated in 2003. More recently,
Rosner and Goldberg (2011a) from the University of Chicago also
updated their previous study and estimated an average cost for the
AP1000 equal to USD2010 4.210/kW.
In addition, we have seen an important decrease in the costs of
competing energy technologies, which undermines even more nuclear
power competitiveness. On the one hand, the prices of natural gas have
decreased significantly due to the use of shale gas in the U.S; and on
the other, renewables have registered important learning effects. For
instance, Lindman and Söderholm (2012) found that the kW coming
from wind farms decreases more than 10% every time that the installed
capacity doubles.
On top of that, we may expect that Fukushima-Daiichi accident to
have consequences in terms of cost. Safety authorities might impose
stricter licensing rules and/or greater public opposition to installing new
nuclear power plants could induce delays and therefore cost overruns.
So far, it seems that there is no escape from this curse. But before
giving up, it is worth reviewing the French experience using the new
data that is available. It is important to mention that Grubler made his
cost assessment using estimations based on an annual investment report
of Électricité De France (EDF) from 1972 to 1998. At the time of this
publication, reliable data on the cost of the French nuclear program were
not available.
Only until the beginning of 2012, the past construction and R&D
expenses related to French nuclear power were publicly available, due to
a request from the Prime Minister to the national audit agency Cour
des Comptes. This report brought together all the data concerning the
5 http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2011/11/10/
sur-le-chantier-de-l-epr-a-flamanville-edf-est-a-la-moitie-du-chemin_
1602181_3244.html
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actual construction costs for the 58 reactors installed in France. Using
this data, the cost escalation is less severe that what was argued.
In the light of this result, in this paper we reexamine the cost
drivers for the French nuclear power program using the data of Cour
de Comptes report. We investigate the existence of scale and learning
effects, as well as the relation between safety performance and costs. We
propose to use a principal component regression approach to deal with
the multicollinearity among the main explanatory variables.
Our results suggest that neither the scale-up nor cumulative
experience induced cost reductions, but we have found a positive learning
effect within similar types of reactors. This finding supports the idea of
standardization as a strategy to reduce the cost overruns linked with
uncertainty in the construction of complex technologies. Additionally,
we found that those reactors with better performance, in terms of safety,
are related with higher costs; thus improvements in safety unsurprisingly,
can also be considered as a driver of the cost escalation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
data and its sources, then sets out the model and estimation procedure.
The results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Construction cost escalation: Data and
Model
After the publication of the Cour de Comptes report, we studied the
EDF investments for the second generation of reactors, that accounts the
actual construction costs of the 58 commercial units currently operating6,
to compare them with previous studies, estimate a cost function and
investigate its main drivers.
Figure 1 compares the official data with the estimated costs computed
by Grubler (2010). We can conclude that the figures for the first reactors
are quite accurate but those for the latest ones were overestimated . This
discrepancy means a difference of 5.21 between the annual average rate
of growth using Grubler’s costs estimations expressed in e2010/kW, and
the one using the Cour de Comptes construction costs. For the former,
we found an average annual increase equal to 8.97% and for the latter,
we got an increase of 3.76% on average per year.
6 See Appendix A
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Figure 1: Grubler vs Cour de Comptes construction costs
As mentioned before, technological heterogeneity is viewed as one of
the main explanations for the cost escalation in the U.S Two types of
technologies (Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling water reactor) have
been installed and practically all of the units have customized sizes and
designs. In contrast, the French nuclear fleet is considered to have a
high degree of standardization, characterized by three different paliers.
This categorization collects reactors by size. The first one comprises 34
installed reactors, all of them have 900MW nameplate capacity. The
second palier includes 20 reactors with 1300 MW and the last one
contains 4 reactors with 1450 MW of installed capacity.
On top of that, within each palier it is possible to find different types
of reactors. The first palier has 3 types of reactors CP0, CP1 and CP2.
Although all of them have the same capacity, they differ in the conception
of their intermediary cooling systems. In the second palier, there are two
types of reactors P4 and P’4 which differ in the layout of the structure
that contains the fuel rods and the circuitry. Finally, in the last palier
there is only one type of reactor, called N4. This design not only differs
in capacity with the rest of reactors, but also in the conception of the
steam generators, primary pumps and command room7.
Figure 2 shows the construction cost in e2010/MW for the French
nuclear plants per type of reactor. It is clear that the cost escalation
in France is also related to changes in the installed technologies. The
7 For a detailed description of the differences between the paliers and types, see
http://rapport-annuel2010.asn.fr/fichiers/Chap_12_2010.pdf
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Figure 2: Cour de Comptes construction cost by Palier and Type
average cost for the first series of reactors (CP0) was the smallest, and
it continuously increased as other types were installed. In this sense,
Grubler (2010) stated that the high cost escalation towards the end
of the program is precisely the result of the "gradual erosion of EDF
determination to standardize".
By using a linear regression model, we seek to determine the
construction cost main drivers. We assume a Cobb-Douglas cost function
in which the explanatory variables are: capacity, experience, safety
performance indicators and finally a random error.
ln(Ci) = β0 + β1 ln(Capi) + β2EXPIi + β3EXPPi + β4EXPTi
+β5UCLi + β6US7i + β7 ln(LTimei) + ui (1)
Where:
• Ci: Construction cost for the pair of units i in e2010 per MW
• Capi: Installed capacity in MW
• LTimei: Construction leadtime in months
• EXPIi: Number of completed reactors at the time of the
construction of plant i
6
• EXPPi: Number of completed reactors within the same palier at
the time of the construction of plant i
• EXPTi: Number of completed reactors within the same type at
the time of the construction of plant i
• UCLi: Lifetime average Unplanned Capability Loss Factor for unit
i
• US7i: Lifetime average Unplanned Automatic Scram for unit i
Regarding capacity, in the U.S case the evidence against scale effects
is conclusive. Zimmerman (1982), Krautmann and Solow (1988), Cantor
and Hewlett (1988) and McCabe (1996) found that the construction
of larger reactors8 increased the cost per MW installed. According to
Cantor and Hewlett (1988), bigger units increase project complexity,
subjecting them to managerial problems and stricter regulatory scrutiny.
The positive correlation of lead time and size thus result in higher costs
per MW.
On the contrary, the effect of the overall experience variable in
construction costs is diverse. Komanoff (1981) and Zimmerman (1982)
found positive evidence of a learning curve. They however recognized
that the multicollinearity between the time trend and industry-cumulated
experience, might bias their estimates.
This issue was solved by introducing the experience at firm level
(constructor) and dummy variables to differentiate the management
regime (utility or outsider). The learning effects were significant only
when utilities constructed the plant9.
Given that EDF has been the only builder and utility, it is not
possible to distinguish between industry and firm experience or to include
dummies for management regimes. Nevertheless, we can distinguish
experience within paliers and types of reactors. Therefore, to test the
presence of learning effects, we considered three variables. The first took
into account the overall experience (EXPI), the second variable only
8 Except by Komanoff (1981) pioneering study that suggested a cost decline by 13%
when doubling reactor’s size; nevertheless subsequent papers rejected this result.
9 This striking result was addressed later by Cantor and Hewlett (1988) and McCabe
(1996). The former suggested that the market power of experienced firms allow
them to charge higher prices, so the learning effects are kept as savings, whereas
the latter found that what explains this difference are the poor incentives of the cost-
plus contracts under which nuclear plants were procured to external constructors.
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added the previous reactors made within the same palier (EXPP ) and
the last one accounted the reactors of the same type (EXPT ).
Besides of scale and learning effects, one could also be interested in
identifying whether the cost escalation is linked with safety improve-
ments. According to Cooper (2012), safety variables (fines and the num-
ber of safety standards and rules adopted by the NRC) are the most
consistent predictors to explain the cost escalation in the U.S. In pre-
vious studies (Komanoff (1981),Zimmerman (1982),Cantor and Hewlett
(1988),McCabe (1996)), safety improvements were related with the strin-
gency of the regulatory agency which was represented with a time trend
always found to be significant and positive.
For the French case it is hard to measure regulatory activity.
The Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (independent regulatory agency)
was created in 2006, 4 years after the last reactor was built in
2002. Additionally, Grubler (2010) found that there was no regulatory
documented incidence from 1970 to 1999. However, Finon (2012)
recognized that despite the stability in the French safety rules, EDF
integrated safety reinforcements gradually into new reactors.
To test if safety improvements are related to construction costs, we
included in the model two safety performance indicators defined by The
World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and adopted by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The first one is Unplanned Capability Loss Factor (UCLi), which
reflects a reactor’s ability to maintain the reliability of systems and
components. This indicator belongs to the first category of the safety
performance indicators used by the IAEA, that seeks to quantify how
smoothly the plant operates. The UCL indicator shows the percentage
of energy that the plant was not capable of supplying due to deviations
form normal operations.
The second indicator is Unplanned Automatic Scram (US7i), which
belongs to the second category defined by the IAEA. Within this group,
all the indicators quantify if the plant operates at low risk. The US7
tracks number of automatic shutdowns during one year (7.000 hours)
of operation. We have chosen this measure because it gives a direct
indication of the frequency of actual challenges to the systems, that
submit plant equipment to extreme thermal loads and increase the risk
of serious accidents.
In addition to the Cour de Comptes data, we have also gathered data
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from the Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) database published
by the IAEA. We have taken the installed capacity in MW, the year in
which the reactor was constructed, the construction period length (in
months), the number of reactors that were built by EDF previously to
account the experience, and the average lifetime UCL and US7 for each
pair of units. Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Unit Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std
Ln Cost Ln(e2010/MW) 0.119 0.138 -0.196 0.491 0.170
Ln Cap Ln(MW) 7.656 7.517 7.461 7.987 0.196
EXPI # reactors 27.413 26 1 56 17.307
EXPP # reactors 12.034 12 1 30 8.974
EXPT # reactors 5.103 4 1 16 4.169
UCL % 7.127 7.075 3.075 11.959 2.083
US7 events/7000 hours critical 0.773 0.690 0.180 1.40 0.3169
LTime Ln(months) 151.931 143 115 288 37.183
2.1 Multicollinearity and Principal Component ap-
proach
One of the main problems identified in the literature of nuclear
construction cost escalation is the multicollinearity between explanatory
variables included in the cost function, in particular the high correlation
between installed capacity, industry experience and leadtimes.
To deal with this problem, Zimmerman (1982) suggested to use a
monotonic transformation of overall experience instead of the original
variable. In subsequent studies, such as those of Cantor and Hewlett
(1988) and McCabe (1996), the issue was solved by taking the builder’s
experience into account instead of the overall industry experience, which
eased the high correlation among these variables.
For the French case the multicollinearity problem is severe. There is
a single builder (EDF), the scale-up was progressive and bigger reactors
experienced greater leadtimes. As we can observe in Table 2, these
three variables (Capacity, Overall experience and leadtime) are highly
correlated, which warns the difficulty of obtaining significant results in a
linear regression framework.
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
Ln Cap EXPI EXPP EXPT Ln Ltime US7
Ln Cap 1 0.87 -0.45 -0.24 0.82 -0.08
EXPI 0.87 1 0.03 -0.02 0.77 -0.23
EXPP -0.45 0.03 1 0.55 -0.32 -0.29
EXPT -0.24 -0.02 0.55 1 -0.23 -0.22
Ln LTime 0.82 0.77 -0.32 -0.23 1 -0.23
US7 -0.08 -0.23 -0.29 -0.22 -0.23 1
Indeed, when we include all of them in a linear regression, the
coefficients are imprecisely estimated (See Table 3). On top of that,
we find high estimates for the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which
confirms that the multicolinearity problem is severe.
Table 3: Linear regression estimates
Coefficients Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) 7.700 10.034 0.767 0.451
Ln Cap -0.252 1.216 -0.208 0.838
EXPI 0.017 0.014 1.206 0.241
EXPP -0.002 0.015 -0.186 0.854
EXPT -0.006 0.008 -0.743 0.465
Ln LTime 0.261 0.344 0.761 0.455
UCL -1.410 0.882 -1.598 0.125
US7 -0.009 0.018 -0.487 0.632
Table 4: VIF for explanatory variables
Ln Cap EXPI EXPP EXPT Ln LTime UCL US7
87.808 93.856 29.501 2.143 8.257 24.520 2.328
The traditional way of solving multicollinearity problems is to
eliminate one or more explanatory variables. We have tried different
specifications. Nevertheless they did not result in significant estimates
and the VIF remained high. The results of these models are shown in
Appendix B.
Unfortunately, within this framework it is not possible to figure out
the main drivers, because our data set appears redundant. By using a
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principal component regression, we overcame this limitation. With this
method we can obtain relevant information from our data set, reducing
it to a lower dimension and making it possible to reveal simplified
underlying correlations between the costs and the explanatory variables.
Principal component analysis is an ancient multivariate technique
developed by Pearson (1901) and Hotelling (1933). In economics this
method has been applied in a wide range of subjects10, for instance, in
macroeconomics and finance (Fifield and Sinclair, 2002), development
(Zanella and Mixon, 2000) and socio-economic indexes (Filmer and
Pritchett, 2001).
The main idea of this procedure is to take the correlation matrix,
that we are going to denote by C = X′X (where X is the n × k matrix
of centered and scaled explanatory variables) and compute the k × k
eigenvector matrix11 V.
Given that VV′ = I, we can rewrite a lineal model Y = X ′β∗ as
follows.
Y = β∗01+XVV
′β∗ (2)
Y = β∗01+ Zα (3)
Where Z is the n × k matrix of principal components. This matrix
contains the same information that X but the columns are arranged
according their share in the variance. Each principal component is
a linear combination of the explanatory variables. The weights are
defined by the characteristic vectors or loadings (matrixV) and the roots
(eigenvalues), denoted by λ, identify the most important components (the
higher the eigenvalue, the higher the share in the variance).
Once this decomposition is done, the next step in this framework is to
eliminate the principal components (columns of Z) associated with the
smallest eigenvalues (λ) in order to reduce the variance that is causing
the multicollinearity and be able to estimate significant coefficients.
10We do not pretend to give a comprehensive list of principal component analysis in
economics, rather to mention some examples.
11Recall that the eigenvectors of a square matrix A are defined as the vectors that
solve AW = λW, where λ is a real or complex number called eigenvalue. They can
equivalently be defined as the vectors that solve (A− λI)W = 0
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3 Results
The characteristic vectors and roots for the correlation matrix of the
model12 are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Eigenvectors and eigenvalues of Model 1
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5 Comp 6 Comp 7
Ln Cap 0.563 0.180 -0.211 -0.410 0.651
EXPI 0.522 0.172 0.299 0.338 -0.144 -0.220 -0.652
EXPP -0.219 0.493 0.228 0.702 0.157 0.374
EXPT -0.162 0.473 0.482 -0.564 -0.409 0.174
Ln LTime 0.556 0.211 0.794
UCL -0.558 0.249 -0.716 0.312
US7 -0.134 -0.430 0.765 0.459
λ 81.309 66.434 20.658 13.796 10.206 3.464 0.131
This decomposition can be interpreted as follows. The first
component is the most important because it explains the highest share
of variance and, the variables with the highest loadings are those that
explain the major trend in the data. The subsequent components show
the correlations within variables, independent of previous components.
In our case, the first component explains 41% of the total variance and
has high loadings from: capacity, cumulative experience and leadtime.
This component represents what Cooper (2010) denominated as the
Bupp-Derian-Komanoff-Taylor hypothesis. This hypothesis states that
as nuclear power industry (vendors and utilities) gained experience,
bigger reactors were made and this technological scaling-up induced
greater complexity which resulted in longer leadtimes.
The second component accounts for 33% of the variance. The
variables with high loadings are experience within palier and type and
the two safety performance indicators. Given that in this component the
loadings have opposite signs, constructing similar reactors (either in size
or type), made improvements possible in terms of safety indicators in the
latest units.
If we check the scores13 we can compare the reactors within each
12We have also consider a model without the variable of experience at the palier level
(EXPPi). The results are shown in Appendix C
13The scores represent the linear combination of the explanatory variables in each
principal component for each observation
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Figure 3: Scores of the first two components
component. In Figure 3, the scores for the first component are plotted
on the horizontal axis. We can clearly see that they are clustered at
the palier level, this result simply confirms the fact that bigger reactors
were built as the industry gained experience but it took more time to
construct them.
The second component is plotted on the vertical axis of the same Fig-
ure. Remember that this component represent the negative correlation
between experience (in similar reactors) and safety performance. We can
see that within each type, the units with higher scores are the latest
in their series (more experience and better performance). For instance,
Gravelines 5.6 and Blayais 3.4, correspond to the latest CP1 reactors.
It is also the case for the P4 and P’4 series, where the reactors at Fla-
manville, Golfech and Penly were built after those installed at the Saint
Alban, Cattenom and Belleville sites, respectively. For the same reason,
13
it is no surprise that reactors such as Fesshenheim, Dampierre and Cat-
tenom have small scores in this component, given that they can be seen
as prototypes in their respective series.
To select the number of components to be included in the estimation,
we chose the root mean squared error of prediction (RMSEP) criterion.
Using the leave-one-out cross-validation method, we found that the
RMSEP is minimized with the first two components.
Once the number of principal components had been selected, we
computed the coefficients for the original linear regression. In Table
6 we present the estimates for our explanatory variables14.
Table 6: Principal Component Regression Results
Coefficients βˆ∗ βˆ s.e(βˆ) t-value p-value
Ln Cap 0.206 1.050 (0.280) 3.747 1.11e-03 ***
EXPI 0.209 0.012 (0.002) 4.084 4.90e-04 ***
EXPP -0.046 -0.005 (0.002) -2.177 4.04e-02 *
EXPT -0.026 -0.006 (0.002) -2.706 1.28e-02 *
Ln LTime 0.212 0.995 (0.255) 3.898 7.72e-04 ***
UCL -0.075 -0.036 (0.004) -8.199 3.91e-08 ***
US7 -0.081 -0.257 (0.041) -6.215 2.95e-06 ***
In the light of these results, we confirm that as in the U.S case,
the scaling-up of the French nuclear program did not translate in cost
reduction. This is a well known phenomenon in nuclear power, since the
construction of larger reactors is more complex, hence such a project
implies greater risk of cost overruns (Cooper (2010)). The principal
component approach shows that the strong correlation among capacity,
overall experience and leadtime represents the main driver to explain the
cost escalation. Table 6 shows that an increase in the installed capacity
will induce higher construction cost per MW.
Regarding overall learning effects, we also found that cumulated
experience had not induced a reduction in costs. This result is often
seen as a consequence of the intrinsic characteristics of nuclear power,
i.e. lumpy investments and site-specific design (Cooper (2010) ,Grubler
(2010)).
14Given that we have had to standardized our explanatory variables, we differentiate
the coefficients for the centered and scaled matrix with βˆ∗ and we use βˆ for the
original data.
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As mentioned before, Cooper (2010) suggests that with the construc-
tion of a new reactor, the experience gained by vendors and operators
translates in adjustments and improvements, that complexify the reac-
tors and make the new designs more expensive than their predecessors.
In the French case, Grubler (2010) and Finon (2012) argue that the po-
tential learning effects from the overall industry experience were not fully
exploited, precisely because as they gained experience, it was decided to
construct an entirely new French nuclear reactor.
Nevertheless, when we take into account the experience within the
same palier and type, we find a positive learning effect. In Table 6, we
can see that the estimates for these variables are negative, however their
effect was less significant than the other variables.
The intuition behind learning effects within type of reactor is
straightforward, but is less clear at the palier level, precisely because
the reactors within them are not the same. A possible justification is
that, each palier represents also a phase of the French nuclear program.
Hence, the reactors within them were conceived and built during the
same time window, which suggests that suppliers, workers and engineers
did not change substantially during the construction of one palier , but
they might have changed between them.
The negative sign in the experience variables means that some
cost reductions were achieved due to standardization. Building similar
reactors reduced the technological uncertainty linked with the adoption
of a new design. This result can thus been seen as one of the potential
sources of savings for future nuclear reactors, as well as one of the key
differences between the U.S and France cost escalation drivers.
An other important result shown in Table 6, is that reactors with
better safety indicators (UCL and US7) are related with higher costs.
Therefore, we have some evidence that the latest reactors, although more
expensive, have also embodied safety improvements.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we sought to use the Cour de Comptes report to identify
the main drivers of the construction cost escalation in France.
It was originally believed that the cost escalation was about a factor of
3.5, when comparing the unit costs from the units built in 1974 and those
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finished after 1990 (Grubler (2010)). Using the new data, we found that
the escalation was about a factor of 1.5 between the first and the last unit,
thus the escalation was less severe and by no means comparable with the
U.S case. Therefore, important lessons can be drawn from this program
in order to identify the elements that should be taken into account to
overcome or at least mitigate the cost escalation phenomenon.
On the basis of the analysis using the Cour des Comptes data, there is
every reason to believe that the construction cost escalation is mainly due
to the scaling-up strategy. It induced greater complexity and leadtimes
which in turn meant an increase in costs per MW. As mentioned before,
the absence of scale economies in nuclear power is not a new result,
and with the construction of new Generation III and III+ reactors it is
confirmed that larger reactors are more expensive. Hence, capacity could
be one of the starting points in rethinking nuclear power strategy.
In this sense, several authors as Kessides (2012) and Rosner and
Goldberg (2011b) have outlined the advantages of installing small
modular reactors. They argued that these reactors have shorter
construction schedules and lower market risk which reduces the cost of
capital. Additionally, they considered that other cost savings can be
achieved through off-site modules fabrication, as well as the learning by
doing after the production of multiple modules.
This is in line with our results about learning effects. We found that
overall experience did not traduce in lower costs but some gains were
achieved due to the construction of same types of reactors. Given the
nature of this result, it would appear likely that standardization is a
strategy to overcome delays and uncertainties during the construction
process and thus reduce the cost of the following reactors of the same
series.
In view of the results regarding the safety indicators, it appears
likely that reducing the risk of a serious accident has also played its
part in the French cost escalation, as it was found by Cooper (2010) for
the U.S case. Our model shows that in the conception of new nuclear
reactors, safety improvements are undertaken (reflected in better safety
indicators). In consequence when safety concerns are partly internalized
in the construction costs, safer reactors are inherently more expensive.
For this reason, the economics of safety is perhaps the most
challenging issue for the future of nuclear power. On the one hand,
the terrible consequences of a nuclear disaster, such as the ones seen
after Fukushima-Daiichi accident, leave no room for laxity. On the other
16
hand, the particular nature of serious nuclear accidents, huge damages
but very low and uncertain probability of occurrence, makes it difficult
to determine if the safety investments are cost-effective.
Once again, the French case teaches us an important lesson. Principal
component analysis showed that the latest units of the same series have
better performance in terms of the safety indicators used in the model.
In this sense, standardization besides generating learning effects in the
construction process, can also play a role in terms of achieving better
safety levels.
Small reactors also seem to have some advantages in safety terms,
given that as Kessides (2012) pointed out, a simpler design leads to a
lower frequency of accident initiators and a lower core power density
induce a more effective use of passive safety features, that are those
system components that do not require operator control or electronic
feedback in order to shut down safely in case of an emergency.
In summary, the cost escalation curse in nuclear power may have a
solution. Taking into account the lessons from French nuclear program, a
good strategy would be to limit the number of technologies to be installed
in order to obtain learning effects not only in construction costs but also
in operations, in particular in safety performance. It should also be
considered that new technologies, as the small modular reactors, bring
the possibility of reducing the scale of the units as well as off-site module
fabrication, thereby reducing the complexity and leadtimes that have
been consistently found to be the main drivers of the cost escalation
phenomenon.
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Appendix A Cour de Comptes overnight
construction cost
Pair of units Capacity MW Year Type Overnight Cost (Me2010/MW)
Palier 900 MW
Fessenheim1.2 1780 1978 CP0 0,836
Bugey2.3 1840 1979 CP0 0,886
Bugey4.5 1800 1979 CP0 0,899
Damprierre1.2 1800 1980 CP1 1,217
Gravelines1.2 1840 1980 CP1 0,822
Tricastin1.2 1840 1980 CP1 1,188
Blayais1.2 1830 1982 CP1 1,110
Dampierre3.4 1800 1981 CP1 1,172
Gravelines3.4 1840 1981 CP1 0,856
Tricastin3.4 1840 1981 CP1 1,247
Blayais3.4 1820 1983 CP1 0,890
Gravelines5.6 1820 1985 CP1 1,093
SaintLaurent 1.2 1760 1983 CP2 1,120
Chinon 1.2 1740 1984 CP2 1,148
Cruas1.2 1760 1984 CP2 1,119
Cruas3.4 1760 1984 CP2 1,253
Chinon3.4 1760 1987 CP2 0,978
Palier 1300 MW
Paluel1.2 2580 1985 P4 1,531
Paluel3.4 2580 1986 P4 1,157
St Alban1.2 2600 1986 P4 1,129
Flamanville1.2 2580 1987 P4 1,287
Cattenom1.2 2565 1987 P’4 1,358
Belleville1.2 2620 1988 P’4 1,083
Cattenom3.4 2600 1991 P’4 1,149
Nogent1.2 2620 1988 P’4 1,194
Glofech1.2 2620 1992 P’4 1,305
Penly1.2 2660 1991 P’4 1,227
Palier 1450 MW
Chooz1.2 2910 2000 N4 1,635
Civaux1.2 2945 2002 N4 1,251
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Appendix B Linear regression models
We have estimated different linear regression models in order to
deal with the multicollinearity problem among the explanatory variables.
As possible solutions we have decided to replace capacity with dummy
variables at the type or palier level. With these variables we are allowing
that the changes in technology or scale translate in different intercepts.
Given that we have a small sample, the introduction of a dummy variable
for each type of reactor reduces substantially the degrees of freedom thus
we still get non significant coefficients as we can observe in the following
tables.
Table 7: Linear regression estimates with dummy for type of reactor
Coefficients Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) 8.309 4.063 2.045 0.055 .
CP1 0.202 0.114 1.768 0.093 .
CP2 0.445 0.261 1.702 0.106
N4 0.704 0.676 1.042 0.311
P’4 0.618 0.509 1.215 0.240
P4 0.672 0.410 1.637 0.119
EXPI 0.005 0.010 0.519 0.610
EXPT 0.005 0.014 0.357 0.725
Ln LTime 0.564 0.321 1.757 0.095 .
UCL -2.221 0.888 -2.501 0.022 *
US7 -0.014 0.020 -0.680 0.505
Table 8: VIF for the explanatory variables
EXPI EXPT LnLTime UCL US7
8.006 2.721 3.068 5.697 1.934
We have also tried a model without leadtime and overall experience
in the linear regression; given that we already know that they are highly
correlated with capacity. However, we still find that the coefficients are
imprecisely estimated.
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Table 9: Linear regression estimates with dummy for palier
Coefficients Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) 6.014 3.947 1.524 0.142
Palier 2 0.016 0.157 0.104 0.918
Palier 3 -0.049 0.271 -0.181 0.857
EXPI 0.014 0.007 1.922 0.068 .
EXPT -0.008 0.008 -0.983 0.336
Ln LTime 0.343 0.347 0.986 0.335
UCL -1.524 0.895 -1.703 0.103
US7 -0.012 0.019 -0.629 0.535
Table 10: VIF for the explanatory variables
EXPI EXPT LnLTime UCL US7
5.219 1.345 2.920 5.051 1.569
Table 11: Linear regression estimates with dummy for type and no
leadtime
Coefficients Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) -0.127 0.078 -1.627 0.118
CP1 0.208 0.111 1.866 0.076 .
CP2 0.259 0.249 1.040 0.310
N4 0.502 0.604 0.832 0.415
P’4 0.349 0.468 0.746 0.464
P4 0.382 0.385 0.992 0.332
EXPI -0.0002 0.0110 -0.020 0.984
EXPT -0.003 0.0141 -0.217 0.830
Table 12: VIF for the explanatory variables
EXPI EXPT
2.349 7.610
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Table 13: Linear regression estimates with dummy for type and no
leadtime
Coefficients Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) -1.550 1.495 -1.037 0.311
CP1 0.203 0.095 2.120 0.046 *
CP2 0.242 0.096 2.501 0.020 *
N4 0.289 0.241 1.199 0.243
P’4 0.236 0.144 1.640 0.116
P4 0.312 0.119 2.615 0.016 *
EXPT -0.003 0.007 -0.527 0.603
Ln LTime 0.294 0.309 0.952 0.351
Table 14: VIF for the explanatory variables
EXPT LnLTime
1.201 2.68
Appendix C Principal component regression
In this Appendix, we show the results for different specifications for
the construction cost function using the principal component regression.
In general, the results are the same. The first component have high
loadings of capacity, overall experience and leadtime and it is the main
driver of the cost escalation and the second represents the negative
relation between experience within similar types of reactors and the safety
performance indicators.
Nevertheless, when we remove the experience within palier or one
of the safety variables, the criteria to select the number of principal
components to keep in the estimation leads to select only the first one.
Thus the share of the variance that we use to estimate is smaller; however
the signs remain the same as well as the main conclusions.
In Table 15, we have the loadings and eigenvalues for the model
without the variable that captures the experience at palier level, i.e
EXPPi.
As in the original model, the first component has high loading of
capacity, overall experience and leadtime. Which confirms that the main
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Table 15: Eigenvectors and eigenvalues of Model without EXPPi
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5 Comp 6
Ln Cap 0.535 -0.238 0.168 -0.215 0.763
EXPI 0.556 0.221 -0.131 0.601 -0.512
EXPT 0.582 0.639 -0.421 -0.269
Ln LTime 0.553 -0.107 0.207 -0.732 -0.321
UCL -0.214 -0.606 -0.711 -0.173 -0.227
US7 -0.223 -0.475 0.716 0.460
λ 79.649 51.575 20.022 10.208 4.372 2.171
driver of the cost escalation was the scale-up. The second component has
high loadings from the experience constructing the same type of reactors
and the safety indicators. The opposite signs support our previous result,
that suggest that the latest units in each series have the best safety
performances.
In this model we found that the number of components that minimize
the RMSEP is one. The estimates for the standardized and original
variables are presented in Table 16. We obtain the same insights that
with the original model. We confirm the absence of scale effects and an
overall learning curve but we have found positive learning effects when
building the same type of reactors. The negative values for the estimates
related to safety indicators coincide with those found in the complete
model, thus reducing the events that may lead to accidents is related
with higher costs.
Table 16: PC Results for model without EXPPi
Coefficients βˆ∗ βˆ s.e(βˆ) t-value p-value
Ln Cap 0.207 1.0518 (0.266) 3.939 0.0006 ***
EXPI 0.215 0.0124 (0.003) 3.939 0.0006 ***
EXPT -0.021 -0.005 (0.001) -3.939 0.0006 ***
Ln LTime 0.214 1.003 (0.010) -3.939 0.0006 ***
UCL -0.083 -0.083 (0.069) -3.939 0.0006 ***
US7 -0.086 -0.086 (0.254) 3.939 0.0006 ***
We also have consider a model with only US7 as safety variable and
other using UCL solely. The unique difference between these models is
that in the number of components that minimize the RSMSE. In the first
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one, with one component the criterion is minimized, in the second one is
two.
Table 17: Eigenvectors and eigenvalues of Model without UCL
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5 Comp 6
LnCap -0.568 0.173 -0.134 0.453 0.651
EXPI -0.505 0.301 0.265 0.284 0.280 -0.652
EXPP 0.263 0.576 0.173 0.648 0.375
EXPT 0.205 0.543 0.454 -0.671
US7 -0.521 0.814 0.172 -0.163
Time -0.549 0.103 -0.823
λ 81.020 48.474 20.52 13.415 4.431 0.131
Table 18: PC Results for model without UCL
Coefficients βˆ∗ βˆ s.e(βˆ) t-value p-value
Ln Cap 0.208 1.060 (0.254) 4.165 4.03e-04 ***
EXPT 0.185 0.010 (0.002) 4.165 4.03e-04 ***
EXPP -0.096 -0.010 (0.002) -4.165 4.03e-04 ***
EXPI -0.075 -0.0181 (0.004) -4.165 4.03e-04 ***
Ln LTime 0.201 0.945 (0.227) 4.165 4.03e-04 ***
US7 -0.034 -0.108 (0.025) -4.165 -4.03e-04 ***
We found similar results for the other safety indicator.
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Table 19: Eigenvectors and eigenvalues of Model without US7
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5 Comp 6
Ln Cap 0.571 -0.101 -0.266 0.406 -0.654
EXPI 0.501 0.296 0.329 -0.279 0.223 0.652
EXPP -0.276 0.510 0.698 -0.124 -0.155 -0.371
EXPT -0.215 0.521 -0.581 -0.558 -0.177
UCL -0.602 0.231 -0.690 -0.327
LnLTime 0.547 0.132 0.221 -0.789
λ 80.616 57.097 13.797 12.874 3.473 0.140
Table 20: PC Results for model without US7
Coefficients βˆ∗ βˆ s.e(βˆ) t-value p-value
Ln Cap 0.213 1.085 (0.257) 4.217 3.549e-04 ***
EXPT 0.227 0.013 (0.002) 5.103 4.097e-05 ***
EXPP -0.0267 -0.002 (0.001) -1.808 8.427e-02 .
EXPI -0.002 -0.001 (0.003) 1.803 8.504e-02 .
Ln LTime 0.220 1.0301 (0.227) 4.525 1.670e-04 ***
UCL -0.097 -0.046 (0.001) -45.135 3.498e-23 ***
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